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DOES ECONOMIC ENDOGENEITY OF SITE FACILITIES IN RECREATION 
DEMAND MODELS LEAD TO STATISTICAL ENDOGENEITY? 
By 
Min Chen 
Random Utility Models of recreation demand are widely used to relate demand 
and value to the characteristics of recreation sites. Although some kinds of endogeneity 
problems have been studied in previous literature, no study has addressed the potential 
problem with site characteristics that are endogenously supplied. Some site 
characteristics, like facilities, could be endogenous in an economic sense due to the 
interplay of supply and demand. That is, more popular recreation sites tend to have better 
site characteristics since managers with limited budgets would be more willing to invest 
in them. If recreation site improvements are more likely to occur at the more popular sites, 
then this economic endogeneity might cause problems for econometric models linking 
site demand to facilities.  In this paper, we use Monte Carlo simulations to investigate 
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Random Utility Models (RUMs) are widely applied in the travel cost technique 
for valuing recreational activities, relating visitation to travel costs and site characteristics. 
Discrete response models, like multinomial logit or conditional logit, are used to estimate 
people’s choice behaviors. From an econometric standpoint, obtaining consistent 
estimates requires the exogeneity of the independent variables like travel costs and site 
characteristics. 
Specification problems potentially causing bias in travel cost methods were paid 
attention to as early as 1970s, especially the omission of travel time variable and 
congestion effects. Cesario and Knetsch (1970), Brown and Nawas (1973) and Gum and 
Martin (1975) discussed how to incorporate travel time and reduce its multicollinearity 
with travel cost at the same time; McConnell and Duff (1976) and Wetzel (1977) stated 
that congestion effects, if there were any, should be incorporated into the travel cost 
model to avoid estimation bias. Allen Stevens and Barrett (1981) found that the impact of 
excluding travel time and congestion varied from situation to situation. Caulkins, Bishop 
and Bouwes (1985) showed that the omission of cross-price variables did not necessarily 
cause bias, and the sign of the omission bias was determined by the true economic 
relationship.  
Recent studies have focused on the possible types of endogeneity in RUMs. 
Following Ben-Akiva and Lerman (1985), Haab and Hicks (1997) raised the issue that 
the set of alternatives, rather than defined by researchers, could be endogenously 2 
 
determined by individuals. They added weighted probabilities to the log likelihood 
function to reflect the probability that certain sites are selected into the set of alternatives, 
and the estimation results turned out to be very different. Murdock (2006) studied 
unobserved site characteristics absorbed into the error term, which could be correlated 
with the travel cost variable. Monte Carlo simulations were used to test whether the 
proposed approach for addressing this endogeneity problem performed better than the 
traditional methods. Timmins and Murdock (2007) stated that the omission of a variable 
for congestion in the estimation would lead to significant endogeneity problems, since it 
depended on real visits. They supposed individuals made rational decisions given others’ 
choices and considered Nash equilibrium in repeated games. A quantile regression with 
instrumental variables was applied to get new estimates. Von Haefen and Phaneuf (2008) 
developed a combined revealed and stated preference approach to overcome the 
endogeneity of unobserved determinants. 
Those endogeneity problems addressed in this literature have mainly focused on 
the site selection, congestion and omitted variables, and are corrected to ensure the 
consistency of estimates. Now, let’s consider site characteristics that are supplied by 
managers in response to people’s use of a recreation site, for example, facilities. Many 
studies have found that facilities variables are often significant in explaining people’s 
recreational behaviors. Parson (2003) reported the presence of amusement parks and 
restroom facilities as explanatory variables in the latent utility equation, and their 
estimated coefficients were statistically significant at 95% level of confidence.  Lew and 
Larson (2005) included lifeguard presence and parking availability dummies as two 
explanatory variables for beach use, which were also statistically significant. Von Haefen, 3 
 
Massey and Adamowicz (2005) used bathroom availability and public parking in their 
recreational demand estimation. Yeh, Haab and Sohngen (2006) took into account the 
effects of lifeguard and number of picnic tables when valuing recreation trips to beaches. 
Cutter, Pendleton and DeShazo (2007) considered the effects of toilets, trails, tables and 
benches in their model of recreational demand.  
While there is empirical evidence that facilities can affect estimated demand, the 
supply and types of facilities are also determined by people’s visitation as the literature in 
park management makes clear.  Lee and Driver (1999) compared three recreation 
resource management frameworks: activity-based management (ABM), experience-based 
management (EBM) and benefits-based management (BBM). BBM is an extension of the 
first two, aiming at providing public recreation opportunities which people benefit from. 
Shin, Jaakson and Kim (2001) pointed out that “Benefits-based management seeks to 
provide recreation benefits for recreation participants by managing the physical 
environments in which recreation occurs”, and they included facilities and their 
maintenance as one attribute of the setting of recreational sites. Faghri, Lang, Hamad and 
Henck (2002) mentioned a set of criteria for where to optimally locate park-and-ride 
facilities, one of which suggested that a site with lots of traffic passing through should be 
a suitable location. Cook (2008) used a benefit transfer method to estimate the value of a 
new long-distance walking trail in a tropical rainforest. If no people went for recreational 
activities in the forest, managers would not build a walking track since its value was low. 
All of these demonstrate that facilities are more likely to be built on sites where people go. 
This may appear similar to the congestion variable: congestion also happens on 
popular sites, discouraging future visitation though. But the mechanisms are not the same, 4 
 
and the ways to model the endogeneity of congestion and facilities are different. The fact 
that congestion depends on visits comes from the externality problem: one person’s visit 
has negative effects on others. The level of congestion on one site is determined by 
people’s behaviors, so it looks more like a game theory context. For facilities, however, a 
site manager is involved. If we view the managers as the supply side and the 
recreationists as the demand side, managers change facilities in response to recreation 
demand, and recreation demand varies in response to facilities. The interplay of supply 
and demand makes facilities endogenous in the economic sense.  
Notice that facilities are site-specific, so they are endogenous at an aggregate 
level rather than the individual level. In fact, the endogeneity problem of facilities looks 
like the price endogeneity problem in market demand models, which has received lots of 
attention in market analysis literatures. Dhar, Chavas and Gould (2003) stated that price 
endogeneity was an issue in the estimation of aggregate demand functions, resulting in 
simultaneous equation bias. Yang, Chen and Allenby (2003) mentioned that researchers 
had found that failure to account for price endogeneity led to estimation bias in both 
aggregate and disaggregate data. Especially, Villas-Boas and Winter (1999) tested the 
endogeneity of market-mixed variables set by market managers in random utility models, 
and showed that even if those variables were common across all consumers, or 
individuals were price takers and strategically didn’t impact the price setting behavior of 
the sellers, endogeneity would still be a potential problem. Therefore, in recreation 
demand models, although everyone faces the same facilities on all sites, the economically 
endogenous facilities may lead to statistical endogeneity. Accordingly the objective of 5 
 
this paper is to examine in what circumstances the economic endogeneity of facilities 
causes problems to the estimation results.  
To address this issue, Monte Carlo simulations are applied.  In the simulations, we 
set values for the “true” parameters, simulate choices, run regressions, and obtain 
estimates. If there is little bias in the estimates compared with true parameters, the 
economic endogeneity of facilities does not matter. If the differences between estimates 
and true parameters are huge, then facilities are not only economically endogenous but 
also statistical endogenous. The advantage of Monte Carlo simulations is that we know 
what the “truth” is; otherwise, with empirical data, we can test the statistical endogeneity, 
but we cannot judge whether an estimate is biased for sure without knowing its true value. 
In the following sections, we present the basic choice model for our recreation 
demand simulations, and state our extrapolation of possible factors having influence on 
how much economic endogeneity will be reflected on statistical results.  For the 
simulations, we assume all explanatory variables except facilities are exogenous, let 
facilities be determined by recreation demand and supply, and test whether the estimates 
are biased under a variety of situations. Also, some underlying attributes of simulations 
are changed in order to see how sensitive the results are. Finally, we conclude our 
simulation studies after a discussion of those simulation results.    




Conditional Logit Models 
In RUMs, the latent utility that person i gains from visiting site j is: 
??? = ???? + 𝜀??   
Where ??? includes travel cost, which varies across people and sites, and site 
characteristics, which only varies across sites; 𝜀?? is a random term counting for 
unobserved preferences. If there are J sites and individual i chooses to go to site k, utility 
maximization implies that:  
??? = max ??1,??2,…,??𝐽  
The revealed choice variable for this person would be a set of binary responses 
indicating the chosen site: 
 ??1,??2,…,???,…,??𝐽  =  0,0,…,1,…,0 . 
According to McFadden (1974), when 𝜀?? follows a Type I extreme value 
distribution, the maximization of the random utilities yields site choice probabilities that 
are given by a conditional logit model where the probability that individual i chooses site 
k is: 
??? ?  =
𝑒????
  𝑒??? ? 𝐽
?=1
 . 7 
 
The log-likelihood function for the individual is: 
?? = ??   ??? ?  ???
𝐽
?=1




When we have the choices for all recreationists, we can sum their log-likelihood 




Researchers are often interested in how people value the loss of a certain site or 
the welfare change of recreationists corresponding to an environmental quality change. 
For individual i, if we know 𝜀??, where j = 1,2,…,J, we can calculate both of these welfare 
measures. Recall that recreation demand models can measure only use values and 
suppose site k is closed due to some reason; this person puts no value on its loss if site k 
does not give the highest utility (i.e., if site k is not being used). If site k is individual i’s 
choice, due to its closure, i would then go to the site with the second highest utility, say, 
site m. Let ??? = [(𝑀? − ?𝐶??),???] , where (𝑀? − ?𝐶??) is individual i’s income minus 
travel cost to site j, which is also the expenditure on other commodities, and ??? contains 
the covariates for site characteristics. The compensating welfare measure can be 
expressed by: 
???[(𝑀? − ?𝐶??),???] = ???[(𝑀? − ?𝐶?? + 𝐶?),???] 
 8 
 
Given the utilities are known, we have: 
?𝑀(𝑀? − ?𝐶??) + ????? + 𝜀?? = ?𝑀 𝑀? − ?𝐶?? + 𝐶?  + ????? + 𝜀?? 





Where ?𝑀 is the income parameter, the monetary measure of utility, which is the absolute 
value of the travel cost parameter. So the access value of one site is equal to the reduction 
in utility divided by marginal utility of income if it is visited by someone; otherwise, its 
value is zero. When we average the values across people, we will get the average site 
value for each site in one sample.  
As for the value of environmental quality change, assume there is a change of 
quality l on site k, which is small enough to not to make individual i switch to another 
site if it is a bad thing. Following the example above, now we have m=k after the change, 
with ??? = ???









If it is bad then the compensating welfare measure is positive, and vice versa. 
When it is a marginal change, this welfare measure becomes ?? ?𝑀   . Given that we are 
measuring use values, for site j, where j≠k, there is no value for its quality change for 
individual i. Hence, we can get the welfare measure vector simply by multiplying the 
individual choice vector by ?? ?𝑀   . Again, averaging the vectors across people gives the 
average welfare measures of marginal quality change for all sites. 9 
 
In empirical studies, however, there is no way to know the individual error terms. 
We are able to get the estimated values of the welfare measures instead of true values. In 
general, under the conditional logit model, the estimated welfare change for individual i 
caused by any change in the covariates is: 
∆? ?   =
1
?𝑀    ??  exp ???
1?   
J
j=1
  − ??  exp ???
0?   
J
j=1
   
Where ???
1 and ???
0 represent the new status and the initial status respectively. ?𝑀   is the 
estimated coefficient of income variable. 
The estimated marginal value of environmental quality change for individual i is:   
𝜕? ?   𝜕??   =
??  
?𝑀   ?? ?   ? ,? = 1,2,…,𝐽 
Where ?? ?   ?  is the predicted probability of individual i to visit site j. The estimates 
won’t be zero for any of the sites due to the predicted probability. We can get the average 
estimates by averaging those individual estimates across people.   
 
Basic Steps 
To simplify the model, we assume there are three explanatory variables: travel 
cost (TC), quality (Q) which represents exogenous site characteristics, and facilities (F) 
which will serve as our potentially endogenous site characteristic. The latent utility 
equation becomes: 10 
 
??? = ?𝐶???1 + ???2 + 𝐹 ??3 + 𝜀?? 
Following the estimates reported in Parson (2003), we set “true” values for the 
population parameters: 
?1 = −0.06,?2 = 0.49,?3 = 0.06 
Then the utility equation becomes: 
 1      ??? = ?𝐶?? ×  −0.06  + ?? × 0.49 + 𝐹 ? × 0.06 + 𝜀?? 
 
Figure 2-1. Basic Landscape 
We also assume there are 10 recreation sites and 1,000 recreationists. Both sites 
and people are randomly spread out in a certain area. Figure 2-1 illustrates their locations, 
where the red dots represent sites and small black dots are individuals. 
In general, basic steps for the simulation under these settings with exogenous 
independent variables will be as follows:   11 
 
Step I: Take 10,000 random draws for ?𝐶?? uniformly over the range from 0 to 100, since 
travel costs are varying across people and sites. Take 10 uniform random draws for ?? 
from 0 to 2, and 10 uniform random draws for 𝐹 ? from 0 to 5, both of which just vary 
across sites and are the same for all people. These random draws form the pseudo data set 
for explanatory variables. The ranges for the covariates are set to roughly correspond to 
the data in Parson (2003). 
Step II: For individual i, extract his/her ?𝐶??, ?? and 𝐹 ?,? = 1,2,…,10, and produce 10 
random draws for 𝜀?? from a Type I extreme value distribution with a variance of 𝜋2 6   . 
Following Train (2003), the cumulative distribution function for 𝜀?? is: 
𝐹 𝜀??  = exp −exp −𝜀??   
Then its inverse function is: 
𝜀?? = −?? −?? 𝐹 𝜀??    
Since 𝐹 𝜀??  falls between 0 and 1, we can take 10 random draws from a (0, 1) uniform 
distribution first and then use the inverse CDF function to compute 10 correspondent 
random numbers for 𝜀??. 
Step III: Use (1) to calculate ???,? = 1,2,…,10. Pick the maximum, mark it as one and 
others as zero, and we get the pseudo choice variable for individual i. 
Step IV: Repeat Step II and III for 1,000 people to obtain pseudo choices for all 
recreationists, which compose one random sample. 12 
 
Step V: Regress the pseudo choice variable on the pseudo data set for 1,000 people and 
get ?1  , ?2   and ?3  . Do hypothesis tests, where the null hypotheses are that the estimated 
coefficients are equal to their “true” values, and the significance level is chosen to be 5%. 
With the sample size equal to 1,000, the critical value for t statistics at 5% significance 
level is 1.96. 
Step VI: Repeat Step II, III and IV 1,000 times to generate 1,000 random samples, where 
the explanatory variables remain the same but the error terms are newly drawn for each 
sample. Do Step V for each random sample, producing 1,000 ?1  , ?2   and ?3  , which can be 
viewed as samples for three random variables.    
Step VII: For the 1,000 iterations, each with one random sample, calculate the percent of 
times in which the null hypotheses are rejected at 5% significance level, that is, the t 
statistics are greater than the critical value 1.96. For estimated coefficients from the 1,000 
random samples, calculate the descriptive statistics, such as mean, variance and mean 
squared error (MSE).  
Table 2-1. Simulating Individual i’s Choice 
Site  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10 
TC  7.79  61.90  4.23  79.48  56.79  31.95  2.87  71.57  89.71  50.87 
Q  1.02  0.64  1.86  1.45  0.90  1.71  0.33  1.59  1.94  1.31 
F  0.98  4.34  3.48  4.62  2.48  4.98  0.76  1.42  2.45  4.20 
ε  -0.12  0.54  3.61  0.17  7.25  0.62  1.02  0.23  -0.81  1.55 
U  -0.03  -2.60  4.48  -3.61  4.43  -0.16  1.05  -3.20  -5.10  -0.61 
y  0  0  1  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
 
Table 2-1 shows the process of simulating individual i’s choice in one iteration. 
Utilities are computed with the pseudo data for travel cost, site quality and facilities and 13 
 
randomly drawn errors. This individual will choose site 3 since it provides the highest 
utility. Note that travel cost and errors vary across sites and people, but quality and 
facilities only vary across sites, so they stay the same for different people.   
According to Cameron and Trivedi (2005), usually there are two types of 
simulations, one with fixed regressors and the other with random regressors. The 
simulation above is the former.  As for the latter, the steps are very similar, only with a 
modification to step VI in which we will also repeat step I. In each iteration, not only the 
error terms but also the explanatory variables are different. 
 
What Matters? 
Normally, the endogeneity of a variable makes it correlated with the errors and 
thus the estimates are biased. Here, whether facilities become highly correlated with other 
explanatory variables also matters. As stated in the introduction, facilities only vary 
across sites. Their economic endogeneity occurs at an aggregate level, so there might not 
be a lot of correlations between facilities and errors, or to say, the individual choices may 
not affect the levels of facilities very much. The endogeneity effect could be wiped out in 
the regression of individuals. Thus, the fact that the facility variable is site-specific plays 
an important role. 
On the other hand, other site characteristics, like quality, are also the same for all 
people. Given managers build facilities based on past visitation partly determined by 
those characteristics, it won’t be surprising if we see a big correlation between facilities 
and those variables. If this happens, even though facilities are not correlated with 14 
 
individual errors, the multicollinearity of regressors may cause problems to estimates, too. 
Usually, there are many other factors for managers to take into account while investing in 
facilities, like budget, cost of maintenance, etc. When the economic endogeneity of 
facilities is stronger, facilities are more likely to depend solely on past visitation, as a 
result of which the correlation between facilities and other site characteristics will be 
higher, and then we would see bigger bias in our estimates. Hence, in our simulations, we 
incorporate different levels of the strength of economic endogeneity through the supply 
of facilities to investigate whether the correlation between facilities and other site 
characteristics has substantial influence over the statistical results. 
Plus, how important facilities are in the utility equation could also take a part. In 
the utility equation: 
??? = ?𝐶???1 + ???2 + 𝐹 ??3 + 𝜀?? 
?1 is negative while the other two betas are positive. In many applications, it would not 
be uncommon to find that |?𝐶???1| > ???2 and |?𝐶???1| > 𝐹 ??3. That is, the travel cost 
portion of indirect utility is relatively large in magnitude and plays a major role in 
determining the utility level. But if facilities were relatively more important in utility, say 
for example, if facilities were scaled to be more important than travel costs, that is, 






MONTE CARLO SIMULATIONS 
Simulations with Endogeneity 
Following the basic steps described in Section 2, in our simulations, we make 
facilities correlated with past visitation. The way we introduce their economic 
endogeneity is to assume there are no facilities at the sites and then managers determine 
the facility levels at each site based on past visitation. In order to account for some 
heterogeneity, two types of worlds are considered. In the first one, called Case I, people 
don’t care about facilities, and we examine whether the economically endogenous 
facilities would spuriously affect people’s choices (that is, will the estimated conditional 
logit models suggest a significant parameter estimate for the facilities variable even 
though the true parameter is zero). In the second one, called Case II, people do care about 
facilities, and we examine whether the economic endogeneity causes bias in the estimated 
coefficients. The true parameter of the facility variable is 0 in Case I and 0.06 in Case II. 
In Case I, the process of simulations with fixed regressors is somewhat different 
from the one stated in Section 2. We just list the differences below: 
Step I 3a: No data for facilities are created, since there is no facility at the beginning. 
Step III 3a: The utility equation used in this step becomes: 
 2       ??? = ?𝐶?? ×  −0.06  + ?? × 0.49 + 𝜀?? 
Step V 3a: This step includes several sub-steps. 16 
 
1)  Average the pseudo choices across 1,000 people and get the averaged visit for site 
j, j=1,2,…,10, denoted by ?  ?: 






,? = 1,2,…,10 
2)  Suppose the manager’s supply is linearly related with past visitation, and we 
assume the supply equation is: 
 3       𝐹 ? = ?  ?? + 𝑒? 
Since only the relative magnitude of utility matters, we don’t include an intercept 
in (3). The error term for the facilities supply function is assumed to have a 
standard normal distribution, incorporating other factors that may affect facility 
supply, like budget constraint, cost of maintenance, etc.  
The coefficient α can be any number, and it is related to the correlation between 
facilities and average past visitation. 
𝐶??? 𝐹 ?,?  ?  =
𝐶?𝑣(𝐹 ?,?  ?)
 ?𝑎? 𝐹 ? ?𝑎?(?  ?)
=
? ?𝑎?(?  ?)
 ?2?𝑎? ?  ?  + ?𝑎?(𝑒?)
 
Due to the existence of the error term, the correlation increases as α gets bigger. 
We pick several values for α from 10 to 200 to test how sensitive the results are to 
the correlation. 
Take 10 random draws from the standard normal distribution and calculate the 
facility level using (3) for each site, which is obviously endogenous. 17 
 
3)  This is similar to Step V in part 2. We add the supplied facilities to the pseudo 
data set, and the true value for ?3 is zero. 
In Case II, we assume that people do care about facilities, so after facilities are 
provided, people will update their choice of the best site within their choice sets. We need 
to account for this in the process of simulations by making the following modifications to 
the simulation steps: 
Step V 3b: After the calculation of endogenous facilities, we add them to the pseudo data 
set and repeat Step III and IV to get the updated pseudo choices for 1,000 people, where 
the error terms are kept the same and the true ?3 is 0.06. Then the updated pseudo 
choices are used to get estimated coefficients and t statistics. 
For the two types of worlds, the rest of the simulations are the same as basic steps. 
We also run simulations with random regressors. Since the results are very similar, we 
don’t show them for these and the following simulations, and all discussions will focus 
on results from simulations with fixed regressors. 
From Table 3-1, the economic endogeneity of facilities seems to be more of a 
problem as the coefficient in the supply equation increases. Intuitively, the larger the 
correlation between facilities and past visitation is, the stronger the economic 
endogeneity is, as a result of which the statistical bias results become more substantial.
  Look at ?1   first. In all situations, it has a mean equal to its true value, so there is 
no bias in the estimated coefficient for the travel cost variable. It will have unbiased 
standard errors, too, for the variance and MSE are almost the same. The probability to 
reject the true value is very low, around 5%. ?1   is not affected by the endogenous 18 
 
Table 3-1. Simulation Results with Endogeneity 
  Case I  Case II 
    ?1    ?2    ?3    ?1    ?2    ?3   
α=10  True Value  -0.06  0.49  0  -0.06  0.49  0.06 
Mean  -0.06  0.49  0.01  -0.06  0.49  0.07 
Var.  4.3e-06  3.9e-03  2.1e-03  4.3e-06  3.9e-03  2.1e-03 
MSE.  4.3e-06  3.9e-03  2.3e-03  4.3e-06  3.9e-03  2.3e-03 
Percent(%)*  3.8  5.7  5.6  3.9  5.3  4.8 
α=25  True Value  -0.06  0.49  0  -0.06  0.49  0.06 
Mean  -0.06  0.47  0.02  -0.06  0.47  0.08 
Var.  4.3e-06  5.4e-03  2.0e-03  4.3e-06  5.5e-03  2.1e-03 
MSE.  4.3e-06  5.8e-03  2.5e-03  4.3e-06  5.9e-03  2.5e-03 
Percent(%)  4.3  5.5  8.0  3.9  6.0  7.8 
α=45  True Value  -0.06  0.49  0  -0.06  0.49  0.06 
Mean  -0.06  0.43  0.04  -0.06  0.43  0.09 
Var.  5.1e-06  0.008  1.4e-03  5.1e-06  0.009  1.4e-03 
MSE.  5.1e-06  0.012  2.8e-03  5.2e-06  0.012  2.6e-03 
Percent(%)  6.2  9.1  15.7  6.5  9.9  13.4 
α=70  True Value  -0.06  0.49  0  -0.06  0.49  0.06 
Mean  -0.06  0.38  0.05  -0.06  0.38  0.10 
Var.  4.2e-06  0.013  1.1e-03  4.2e-06  0.014  1.2e-03 
MSE.  4.2e-06  0.026  3.1e-03  4.2e-06  0.026  3.0e-03 
Percent(%)  4.7  15.9  23.8  4.8  14.3  21.0 
α=100  True Value  -0.06  0.49  0  -0.06  0.49  0.06 
Mean  -0.06  0.29  0.05  -0.06  0.30  0.11 
Var.  4.2e-06  0.015  6.3e-04  4.1e-06  0.016  7.0e-04 
MSE.  4.2e-06  0.055  3.1e-03  4.1e-06  0.051  2.7e-03 
Percent(%)  5.4  27.6  37.4  3.9  24.1  30.9 
α=200  True Value  -0.06  0.49  0  -0.06  0.49  0.06 
Mean  -0.06  0.23  0.03  -0.06  0.26  0.09 
Var.  4.4e-06  0.010  1.3e-04  4.5e-06  0.017  2.0e-04 
MSE.  4.4e-06  0.079  1.2e-03  4.5e-06  0.071  9.6e-04 
Percent(%)  4.5  38.8  49.1  4.5  30.0  34.4 
*Percent of times to reject null hypotheses at 5% significance level that the estimates are 
equal to their true values  
facilities. This makes sense, since travel cost varies both across people and sites and it 
has the biggest variation. In fact, if we set the sample size large enough, the fraction of t 
statistics can be compared with the level of significance to determine whether the 19 
 
estimate is actually consistent, because when an estimate is consistent, the probability to 
reject its true value should be close to the chosen significance level. 
For ?2  , when α is 10, the mean is equal to its true value and the variance is equal 
to the MSE. There is no bias in the estimated coefficient for the quality variable and the 
standard errors. The percents are around 5%. So ?2   has a good performance in this 
situation. When α is 25, the percents are still around 5%; however, the bias in the mean 
starts to come out. The mean is smaller than the true value by 0.02, which is a 4% 
downward bias. The MSE is a little greater than the variance. When α increases to 45, 
there is a 12% downward bias in the mean, and the variance and MSE are also growing. 
The percents are close to 10%. Although this is bigger than 5%, more than 90% of the 
time we cannot reject the true value of ?2  . As α keeps increasing, the bias in the mean 
becomes larger. The difference between variance and MSE is also getting bigger, but 
both of them are in the same magnitude as those with α equal 45. When α goes up, it is 
more likely to reject the true value of ?2  . The probability is about one third with α equal 
to 200. 
  ?3   is the estimated coefficient for the facility variable, which is hypothesized to 
be influenced by the endogeneity. When α is 10, the mean is greater than the true value 
by 0.01. In Case II, that is a 17% upward bias. The variance is smaller than the MSE, so 
there is also some bias in the standard errors. The probability to reject the true value of ?3   
is around 5%. When α is 25, the bias in the mean in Case II grows to 33%. The variance 
and MSE do not change much though. The chances to reject the true value of ?3   are still 
less than 10%. When α is 45, in Case II, there is a 50% upward bias. The variance and 20 
 
MSE are lower to some extent. The percents now exceed 10%. When α is 70 or even 
bigger, the bias of the mean could reach almost 83%, or at least 67%. The variance and 
MSE are getting smaller as α gets bigger, but the differences between the two are very 
obvious in these situations. The percents are almost 50% in Case I when α is 200, and 
close to 40% in Case II. Thus, nearly half of the time we would reject the true value of ?3  . 
Based on the results, we can see that as the correlation between facilities and past 
visitation increases, there is more bias in the estimated coefficients, and the probability to 
reject their true values is getting bigger, too. When the coefficient in the facility supply 
equation is small, the economic endogeneity of facilities is not a big problem. When this 
coefficient is very big, not only the estimate for the facility variable, but also the estimate 
for the quality variable is affected. Facilities’ economic endogeneity has spillover effects. 
In addition, comparing the results derived in Case I and Case II, they are similar, but it is 
easier to reject the true values of the estimates in Case I. So if people don’t care about 
facilities and we still put that variable in the estimation, we are more likely to have 
trouble with economically endogenous facilities than when people do care about facilities. 
 
Correlations 
The correlation between facilities and past visitation becomes larger when the 
coefficient in the facility supply equation increases. As discussed in Section 2, the 
correlation between facilities and past visitation could lead to multicollinearity with other 
site-specific variables beside correlation with errors. When the endogeneity of facilities is 
at the aggregate level, the correlation with errors is small, but as the correlation between 21 
 
facilities and past visitation increases, which is equivalent to saying that the economic 
endogeneity gets stronger, the correlation with other site characteristics may go up. 
Particularly, here an individual’s past visitation to each site is negatively 
correlated with travel cost and positively correlated with quality. Given facilities are built 
on average past visitation, they should also be correlated with travel cost and quality to 
some extent, although the correlations may not be in the same magnitude. And we would 
see larger correlations with a bigger α. To illustrate this point, we compute correlations of 
endogenous facilities with travel cost and quality. 
Table 3-2. Correlations of Facilities with Travel Cost and Quality 
  α=10  α=25  α=45  α=70  α=100  α=200 
TC-F*  0  0  0  0.01  -0.02  -0.01 
Q-F**  0.27  0.57  0.71  0.72  0.86  0.91 
*Correlation between travel cost and facilities; **Correlation between quality and 
facilities 
From Table 3-2, we could find that facilities and travel cost are almost 
independent, no matter how big the supply coefficient is. This is possible, since travel 
cost has a greater variation than facilities do. There are only 10 levels of facilities, but 
1,0000 different travel costs. Plus, in the landscape where both people and sites are 
randomly located, individual choices are very different. The best site for one person 
could be the worst for another. When we average them to get average past visitation, the 
effect of travel cost becomes minimal. Since facilities are built based on the average 
visitation, the correlation between facilities and travel cost is almost zero.   
When it comes to quality, another site characteristic, we see that the endogeneity 
of facilities can induce a multicollineartiy problem. Since all recreationists face the same 22 
 
quality and prefer a site with better quality, the effect of quality will not be wiped out by 
averaging. When α is 10, the correlation is small, close to 0.30. When α is 25, the 
correlation is larger than 0.5, but we do not see much bias of the estimated preferences 
yet. The results become substantial when α grows to 45, and the correlation between 
facilities and quality is as high as 0.7. It keeps increasing as α gets bigger, which is what 
we would expect. So in this situation, the multicollinearity between facilities with quality 
needs to be very high to cause bias to the estimates. Then in empirical studies, we can use 
this correlation for the purpose of diagnosis when we have the landscape of random 
location. If the correlation is too high, we might suspect the facilities to be economically 
endogenous, and this economic endogeneity would be strong enough to cause problems 
to the estimation. 
 
Site-Specific Property 
In both Section 1 and Section 2, we mentioned that the fact that facilities are 
endogenous at an aggregate level plays an important role in whether the endogeneity is 
worth worrying about. To test this, we change the supply mechanism a little bit. Instead 
of averaging across all people in one sample, we divide 1,000 people into 10 groups and 
100 groups respectively. Under each division principle, we average past visitation within 
every group, and the facilities are correlated with the group’s average visits to each site. 
We do the regression for all groups as a whole, so facilities are no longer site-specific, 
but group-specific. We apply the new mechanism to Case I and Case II under the 
situation where α is 25.  23 
 
Table 3-3. Simulation Results with Group-Specific Facilities 
  Case I  Case II 
    ?1    ?2    ?3    ?1    ?2    ?3   
10 
Groups 
True Value  -0.06  0.49  0  -0.06  0.49  0.06 
Mean  -0.06  0.36  0.15  -0.06  0.37  0.20 
Var.  4.9e-06  3.8e-03  6.3e-04  5.0e-06  4.0e-03  6.8e-04 
MSE.  4.9e-06  2.0e-02  0.024  5.0e-06  1.9e-02  0.020 
Percent(%)  5.6  44.4  100  5.5  39.6  100 
100 
Groups 
True Value  -0.06  0.49  0  -0.06  0.49  0.06 
Mean  -0.06  0.14  0.33  -0.06  0.15  0.35 
Var.  4.9e-06  2.2e-03  1.4e-04  5.0e-06  2.4e-03  1.6e-04 
MSE.  5.6e-06  0.13  0.11  7.1e-06  0.12  0.083 
Percent(%)  5.9  100  100  8.0  100  100 
 
When we divide people into 10 groups, ?1   remains unaffected with no bias in the 
mean and standard error. The percents are a little bit greater than 5%. For ?2  , there is a 
more than 20% downward bias. The variance and MSE are different, and the probability 
to reject its true value is around 40%. For ?3  , the percents are 100%, so we can reject its 
true value for sure. In Case II, the upward bias is more than two times of the true value 
itself. The variance and MSE are not even in the same magnitude. 
When we further divide people in 100 groups, even ?1   gets affected. Although the 
mean is the same as its true value, there are some differences between the variance and 
MSE. The percents are still lower than 10%, but in Case II, the percent already grows to 
8%, which is quite big for ?1  . In this situation, the probability to reject the true value of 
?2   is 100%. Its downward bias in the mean is larger than 60%. The MSE is at least 100 
times of the variance. ?3   is severely biased with a greater bias. 24 
 
Table 3-4 shows estimated correlations of facilities with travel cost and quality. 
Endogenous facilities are not correlated with the two exogenous variables very much, but 
the economic endogeneity definitely cause bias to at least ?2   and ?3  .   
Table 3-4. Correlations of Facilities with Travel Cost and Quality 
  10 Groups  100 Groups 
TC-F  -0.01  -0.09 
Q-F  0.36  0.17 
 
When facilities are supplied on a more individual-specific basis, individual 
unobserved preferences become more important and endogenous facilities are more 
highly correlated with the errors than with other variables, which leads to the typical 
statistical endogeneity problem. That’s why the correlation of facilities with quality 
decreases as the number of groups increases, and the correlation with travel cost goes up 
a little bit, because travel cost is individual-specific. We don’t need the coefficient in the 
facility supply equation to be very big to see a huge bias in the estimates. On the contrary, 
when facilities are provided at the aggregate level, idiosyncratic effects are averaged out 
and other site characteristics become the key factors. But the induced multicollinearity 
has to be very severe to cause problems in the estimation, at least in the landscape with 
random location. Therefore, this site-specific property of facilities greatly diminishes the 
effect of the economic endogeneity.   
   




To investigate how other basic settings in Monte Carlo simulations would 
influence the simulation results, we conduct sensitivity analyses by changing some 
elements of the simulation.  For example, we change the number of sites from 10 to 5 and 
to 15. We use discrete facilities instead of continuous ones. Also, we randomly pick 
numbers as the “true” population parameters rather than use the values from the Parson 
(2003) study. We pick several groups of randomly drawn parameters as the true values 
for βs. For each group of randomly drawn parameters, ?1 is uniformly drawn over the 
range of -0.1 and 0; ?2 is uniformly drawn over the range of 0 and 1; ?3 is uniformly 
drawn over the range of 0 and 0.1. The ranges are chosen with respect to their true values 
in previous simulations, allowing variations to some extent. Simulations are done under 
situations when α equals 25 and 70. In the statistics below, we just show the means and 
percent of times we reject the null hypotheses that estimated parameters equal their true 
values. 
With a general view of these data, changing these settings of simulations does not 
change the results very much. When we assume the facilities to be discrete, or we change 
the true values of the parameters, the results are similar.  The mean of ?2   has a downward 
bias and the mean of ?3   has an upward bias. There is no bias in the mean of ?1  . Chances 
to reject the true value of ?3   are greater than those to reject the true value of ?2  . The 
results in Case I seem to be more substantial than in Case II.  
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Table 4-1. Results of Sensitivity Analyses  
  Case I  Case II 
  ?1    ?2    ?3    ?1    ?2    ?3   
5 Sites  α=25  True Value  -0.06  0.49  0  -0.06  0.49  0.06 
Mean  -0.06  0.45  0.03  -0.06  0.45  0.08 
Percent(%)  4.2  4.8  5.7  4.8  4.8  5.6 
α=70  True Value  -0.06  0.49  0  -0.06  0.49  0.06 
Mean  -0.06  0.34  0.03  -0.06  0.36  0.09 
Percent(%)  5.7  10.6  10.5  5.8  9.8  10.4 
15 Sites  α=25  True Value  -0.06  0.49  0  -0.06  0.49  0.06 
Mean  -0.06  0.48  0.03  -0.06  0.48  0.08 
Percent(%)  6.1  5.8  11.1  5.1  5.1  9.0 
α=70  True Value  -0.06  0.49  0  -0.06  0.49  0.06 
Mean  -0.06  0.38  0.05  -0.06  0.39  0.11 
Percent(%)  5.6  15.8  37.7  5.2  15.8  30.6 
Discrete 
Facilities 
α=25  True Value  -0.06  0.49  0  -0.06  0.49  0.06 
Mean  -0.06  0.47  0.02  -0.06  0.48  0.08 
Percent(%)  5.2  4.8  8.1  5.0  5.0  7.0 
α=70  True Value  -0.06  0.49  0  -0.06  0.49  0.06 
Mean  -0.06  0.38  0.05  -0.06  0.39  0.10 




α=25  True Value  -0.01  0.24  0  -0.01  0.24  0.08 
Mean  -0.01  0.22  0.02  -0.01  0.23  0.10 
Percent(%)  5.9  5.3  10.7  4.8  5.0  9.9 
α=70  True Value  -0.01  0.24  0  -0.01  0.24  0.08 
Mean  -0.01  0.16  0.05  -0.01  0.16  0.12 




α=25  True Value  -0.04  0.95  0  -0.04  0.95  0.04 
Mean  -0.04  0.90  0.02  -0.04  0.90  0.06 
Percent(%)  4.1  6.6  6.8  4.4  6.1  7.2 
α=70  True Value  -0.04  0.95  0  -0.04  0.95  0.04 
Mean  -0.04  0.67  0.05  -0.04  0.68  0.09 




α=25  True Value  -0.03  0.53  0  -0.03  0.53  0.06 
Mean  -0.03  0.50  0.03  -0.03  0.50  0.08 
Percent(%)  4.8  7.8  10.1  5.9  7.8  9.3 
α=70  True Value  -0.03  0.53  0  -0.03  0.53  0.06 
Mean  -0.03  0.37  0.04  -0.03  0.38  0.10 
Percent(%)  4.2  22.7  29.9  4.6  19.6  25.1 27 
 
The number of sites matters to some extent. More sites tend to generate more bias. 
Although the bias of estimates is a little bit bigger in the situation of 5 sites, the 
probabilities to reject the true values are much bigger in the situation of 15 sites, 
especially for ?3  , and by almost two or three times. If we compare the correlations 
between facilities and quality from Table 4-2 in the two situations, we can see that with 
the same α, this correlation is higher with fewer sites. When there are more sites with 
fixed number of recreationists, there is more variation in facilities. The aggregation effect 
is reduced, and individual factors have more influence over the supply of facilities. Their 
economic endogeneity is more likely to cause bias. So the results are consistent with the 
argument in Section 3.    
Table 4-2. Correlations in Sensitivity Analyses 
  TC-F  Q-F 
5 Sites  α=25  -0.01  0.55 
α=70  -0.02  0.95 
15 Sites  α=25  0  0.32 
α=70  0  0.67 
Discrete F  α=25  0  0.50 
α=70  0  0.79 
Random Parameter 
1 
α=25  0  0.26 
α=70  0  0.55 
Random Parameter 
2 
α=25  -0.02  0.86 
α=70  0  0.86 
Random Parameter 
3 
α=25  0.01  0.62 
α=70  0  0.87 
 
Although the correlation between facilities and quality is lower in the situation 
with 15 sites than with 5 sites, it increases as α gets bigger. As before, this correlation 
needs to be very big to cause substantial bias in the estimates. In the situation with 
discrete facilities, the correlations also have a similar pattern. In the situations with 28 
 
different true parameters, the correlation still grows when α increases, but the magnitude 
of correlations is different, which may be attributed to the change of the relative 
importance of variables in the utility equation. A higher parameter means that variable 
becomes relatively more important. So when the true parameter of the quality variable is 
larger, the level of its correlation with facilities increases. The smaller ?2 is, the lower 
correlation that is needed to make the bias in the results substantial.  
Since the level of correlations between facilities and site quality that cause bias to 
estimates differs with different number of sites and different parameters, a general rule for 
judging whether there will be statistical endogeneity by simply checking how the facility and 
quality variables are correlated is difficult to offer; however, it is still the case that the coefficient 
in the facility supply equation determines whether the economic endogeneity of facilities is a big 
problem.        
Overall, the patterns observed in the above simulations appear robust for the types of 
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Section 5 
SIMULATIONS WITHOUT FACILITY VARIABLE 
Based on the results above, we notice one point: when the endogeneity causes 
bias to the estimated coefficient for facilities, the estimated coefficient for quality will 
also be affected. Thus we ask, will the endogeneity still influence that estimate when 
there is no facility variable in the recreation demand model? That is, can one simply drop 
the facilities variables? To test this, we do the simulations without the facility variable. 
That is, keeping other steps described in Section 2 to be the same, we regress people’s 
choices only on travel cost and quality, even if there are newly built facilities available. 
As we would expect, in Case I, no matter how large α is, the estimates are 
unaffected, as the probabilities to reject their true values are about 5%. There is no bias in 
the means and the standard errors. For both estimates, the variance and MSE are almost 
the same. When people don’t care about facilities, it is correct to not include the facility 
variable. 
In Case II, when people care about facilities but we do not put the facility variable 
in our regression, even though travel cost and quality are exogenous, we can see a big 
problem here. Again, ?1   is hardly affected. It remains unbiased with the percents around 
5%. The means are equal to its true value in all situations, and the variance and MSE are 
also the same. ?2   now has an upward bias, which grows very fast as α increases. When α 
is 200, the mean is almost twice the true value. The variance and MSE become larger, too, 
and their differences are also getting bigger. The probability to reject its true value grows 30 
 
dramatically, from 9.8% to 99.3%. ?2   is biased in almost all the time when the economic 
endogeneity of facilities is very strong.  
Table 5-1. Simulations without the Facility Variable 
  Case I  Case II 
?1    ?2    ?1    ?2   
α=10  True Value  -0.06  0.49  -0.06  0.49 
Mean  -0.06  0.49  -0.06  0.52 
Var.  4.7e-06  6.23e-03  4.6e-06  8.2e-03 
MSE.  4.7e-06  6.23e-05  4.6e-06  8.8e-03 
Percent(%)*  4.7  5.2  4.9  9.8 
α=25  True Value  -0.06  0.49  -0.06  0.49 
Mean  -0.06  0.49  -0.06  0.54 
Var.  4.1e-06  6.3e-03  4.2e-06  9.5e-03 
MSE.  4.1e-06  6.3e-03  4.2e-06  0.012 
Percent(%)  4.6  4.6  4.8  14.1 
α=45  True Value  -0.06  0.49  -0.06  0.49 
Mean  -0.06  0.49  -0.06  0.59 
Var.  4.4e-06  4.6e-03  4.4e-06  7.9e-03 
MSE.  4.4e-06  4.6e-03  4.4e-06  0.018 
Percent(%)  5.9  5.6  5.3  36.8 
α=70  True Value  -0.06  0.49  -0.06  0.49 
Mean  -0.06  0.49  -0.06  0.65 
Var.  4.5e-06  6.7e-03  4.4e-06  0.013 
MSE.  4.5e-06  6.7e-03  4.4-06  0.039 
Percent(%)  4.7  5.0  4.5  47.2 
α=100  True Value  -0.06  0.49  -0.06  0.49 
Mean  -0.06  0.49  -0.06  0.69 
Var.  4.8e-06  4.8e-03  4.9e-06  0.012 
MSE.  4.8e-06  4.8e-03  4.9e-06  0.054 
Percent(%)  7.0  6.3  6.6  76.0 
α=200  True Value  -0.06  0.49  -0.06  0.49 
Mean  -0.06  0.49  -0.06  0.95 
Var.  4.6e-06  3.7e-03  4.8e-06  0.015 
MSE.  4.6e-06  3.7e-03  4.8e-06  0.23 
Percent(%)  5.0  5.2  5.8  99.3 
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The correlations between facilities and the two variables are shown in Table 5-2. 
Since the supply mechanism is the same as the previous simulations with endogeneity, 
the correlations should not be that different. Compared with those in Table 3-2, the 
results in Table 5-2 are similar, showing that the economic endogeneity is getting 
stronger as α increases. 
Table 5-2. Correlations of Facilities with Travel Cost and Quality 
  α=10  α=25  α=45  α=70  α=100  α=200 
TC-F*  0  0  0  -0.01  0.01  -0.01 
Q-F**  0.18  0.39  0.66  0.73  0.81  0.92 
 
As long as facilities have impacts on people’s choices, no matter whether the 
facility variable is included in the model or not, their economic endogeneity will 
influence the estimated coefficient of site quality. Actually, compared with previous 
results, the bias is a lot larger and in a different direction. Chances to reject the true value 
of ?2   are also much bigger when we don’t put facilities in the regression in Case II. 
Statistical endogeneity comes from the fact that regressors are correlated with errors. The 
economic endogeneity of facilities makes facilities correlated with the error term in the 
utility equation. In Case II of basic simulations, facilities are in the regression, so the 
correlation between regressors and errors is just the correlation between facilities and 
errors, which is not very big because facilities are endogenous at the aggregate level. The 
bias in the estimates mainly comes from the induced multicollinearity of facilities with 
site quality. In Case II of the simulations above, facilities become part of errors. Since 
facilities are highly correlated with quality, now the correlation between regressors and 
errors is much larger which explains why the bias is more remarkable in this case. 32 
 
Section 6 
SIMULATIONS IN DIFFERENT LANDSCAPES 
The landscape we have used does not involve any spatial clustering of individuals 
which implies maximal variation in the individual specific travel costs. Both people and 
recreation sites are spread out.  Thus, the high variation in travel costs leads to very 
robust estimation of the travel cost parameter despite the level of facilities endogeneity. 
Also, as a result, on average, the probability of visitation should be almost the same for 
all sites. And it is the case in our simulation results. When we average the visits across all 
people, we find that each of the 10 sites has a probability of about 0.10 to be visited. So it 
does not make much difference from the case in which managers do not consider past 
visitation and construct similar facilities on all sites. Therefore, the landscape could also 
have effects on the simulation results. 
On the contrary, it would be common that recreationists cluster at some areas, like 
cities. Further, suppose sites are dispersed along a shoreline, such as beaches, rather than 
being randomly dispersed across the landscape. Now, by construction, there would be 
some sites that are more frequently visited than others. In fact, this situation is somewhat 
closer to reality. Based on empirical observations on the distribution of site visits, Lupi 
and Feather (1998) proposed an aggregation approach for recreation sites based on their 
popularity and potential for being altered by policy. In their survey of sport fishing in 
Minnesota, Lake Mille Lacs dominated all other lakes; Lake of the Woods, Lake 
Minnetonka and Lake Leech were the second popular; when it came to other lakes, the 33 
 
number of visitors dramatically declined. So, in these cases, even if we focus on average 
past visitation, the popular sites would be more similar across choice sets.  
 
 
Figure 6-1. Four Landscapes with Clustering 
Now we randomly draw 10 points on y-axis as recreation sites, and take random 
points inside one or more circles as people living in cities. The landscapes are shown in 
Figure 6-1. Simulations are run under the four landscapes, with other settings the same as 
before. The results are shown in Table 6-1.  34 
 
Table 6-1. Simulation Results under Different Landscapes 
  Case I  Case II 
?1    ?2    ?3    ?1    ?2    ?3   
One 
City 
True Value  -0.06  0.49  0  -0.06  0.49  0.06 
α=25  Mean  -0.06  0.49  0  -0.06  0.49  0.06 
Var.  2.1e-05  7.8e-03  2.3e-04  3.9e-05  0.012  3.5e-04 
MSE.  2.1e-05  7.8e-03  2.3e-03  3.9e-05  0.012  3.5e-04 
%  5.2  5.8  5.2  4.6  6.0  4.9 
α=70  Mean  -0.06  0.49  0  -0.06  0.50  0.06 
Var.  4.4e-05  0.018  6.9e-05  1.7e-04  0.077  2.2e-04 
MSE.  4.4e-05  0.018  6.9e-05  1.7e-04  0.077  2.3e-04 
%  4.7  5.2  5.1  5.2  4.5  5.3 
Two 
Cities 
True Value  -0.06  0.49  0  -0.06  0.49  0.06 
α=25  Mean  -0.06  0.47  0.02  -0.06  0.47  0.08 
Var.  2.1e-04  7.1e-03  1.6e-03  2.2e-04  7.4e-03  1.6e-03 
MSE.  2.1e-04  7.4e-03  2.0e-03  2.2e-04  7.6e-03  2.0e-03 
%  5.1  4.8  8.0  5.3  5.1  8.0 
α=70  Mean  -0.06  0.44  0.01  -0.06  0.45  0.07 
Var.  5.3e-05  6.8e-03  3.5e-04  5.7e-05  7.1e-03  3.5e-04 
MSE.  6.9e-05  9.1e-03  5.5e-04  7.0e-05  8.9e-03  4.9e-04 
%  10.2  10.1  12.4  8.6  9.6  11.2 
Five 
Cities 
True Value  -0.06  0.49  0  -0.06  0.49  0.06 
α=25  Mean  -0.06  0.46  0.02  -0.06  0.46  0.08 
Var.  1.3e-05  6.6e-03  1.2e-03  1.3e-05  6.8e-03  1.2e-03 
MSE.  1.3e-05  7.3e-03  1.5e-03  1.3e-05  7.4e-03  1.5-03 
%  4.6  7.0  7.4  4.4  6.3  6.1 
α=70  Mean  -0.06  0.43  0.02  -0.06  0.43  0.07 
Var.  1.3e-05  7.5e-03  3.4e-04  1.4e-05  8.8e-03  3.9e-04 
MSE.  1.4e-05  0.011  6.1e-04  1.4e-05  0.012  6.0e-04 
%  4.7  10.9  14.8  4.6  9.2  10.4 
Ten 
Cities 
True Value  -0.06  0.49  0  -0.06  0.49  0.06 
α=25  Mean  -0.06  0.46  0.02  -0.06  0.46  0.08 
Var.  1.6e-05  7.1e-03  1.5e-03  1.6e-05  7.4e-03  1.5e-03 
MSE.  1.6e-05  7.9e-03  1.9e-03  1.6e-05  8.2e-03  1.9e-03 
%  4.8  6.8  9.6  5.3  6.0  8.8 
α=70  Mean  -0.06  0.34  0.04  -0.06  0.35  0.10 
Var.  1.1e-05  0.015  7.5e-04  1.1e-05  0.017  8.3e-04 
MSE.  1.1e-05  0.038  2.5e-03  1.1e-05  0.037  2.3e-03 
%  4.9  19.4  26.4  4.6  17.8  22.4 35 
 
When we increase the coefficient in facility supply equation, we expect the bias to 
be more and more substantial, as in the previous landscape. However, this is not the case 
in all the four landscapes. In the landscapes with five and ten cities, we can see the 
chances to reject the true values are growing and the bias in the estimates is getting 
bigger as the coefficient increases. This makes sense because when the number of cities 
increases, the landscape becomes closer to the previous landscape where both people and 
recreation sites are randomly located. In the landscapes with one and two cities, 
especially when there is only one city, even if the coefficient is very large, the results are 
not very different from those with the coefficient equal to 25. The bias is very close to 
zero; the variance and MSE are almost the same; the probabilities to reject the estimates’ 
true values are around 5% at 5% significance level. In other words, we don’t really see a 
problem with economically endogenous facilities in the landscape with only one city. 
Table 6-2. Correlations under Different Landscapes 
  One City  Two Cities  Five Cities  Ten Cities 
α=25  α=70  α=25  α=70  α=25  α=70  α=25  α=70 
TC-F  -0.72  -0.68  -0.02  -0.24  -0.07  -0.16  -0.09  0.01 
Q-F  0.42  0.25  0.39  0.56  0.54  0.84  0.54  0.85 
  
From the correlations, if we look at the last three big columns, correlations 
between facilities and quality grow as α increases, and also more statistical endogeneity 
comes out. In the landscape with only one city, the correlation between facilities and 
travel cost is as big as -0.6 or -0.7. This is because all people face similar travel cost 
besides quality and facilities. Given travel cost is the most important in the decision-
making process, nearly all people go to the same site. Past visitation highly relies on 
travel cost, as we mentioned in the beginning that travel cost is the most important in the 36 
 
utility equation, or to say, people’s decision-making process. Even if a distant site has 
very good quality, most people won’t go there. Thus, facilities are more likely to 
correlate with travel cost than with quality in this case. However, this big correlation does 
not cause bias to the estimates at all, even including the estimated coefficient for travel 
cost! Comparing it with the fact that a big correlation between facilities and quality leads 
to biased estimates, we would suspect that when people have  almost the same choices, 
the effect of travel cost doesn’t go away when we derive the average past visitation. 
Facilities have little influence on people’s choices because they are built on sites which 
are already preferred by most people, so even a strong economic endogeneity won’t cause 
big bias to the estimates. 
To further prove this point, we create an extreme case: reducing the scale of travel 
cost to the same level as quality and facilities. Simulations before with only one city have 
the average value of travel cost about 150. The average values of endogenous facilities 
differ according to the coefficient in facility supply equation. They could be as low as 5 
and as big as 100. In the following simulations, we set the average value of travel cost to 
be around 5. Then as the coefficient in facility supple equation increases, the scale of 
facilities become larger and facilities will dominate travel cost in the utility equation. The 
results are shown in Table 6-3 and Table 6-4. 
For ?2   and ?3  , when α is equal to 10, the results are very similar to previous ones. 
Given the scales of travel cost and facilities are more or less the same, when all people 
cluster in one city, we could still get some bias in the estimates for quality and facilities. 
The variance and MSE are more or less equal. When α goes to 25, 45 or even bigger, the 37 
 
bias increases, the probabilities to reject their true values increases and the differences 
between variance and MSE also become larger. 
Table 6-3. Simulation Results under the Landscape with One City 
  Case I  Case II 
    ?1    ?2    ?3    ?1    ?2    ?3   
α=10  True Value  -0.06  0.49  0  -0.06  0.49  0.06 
Mean  -0.06  0.48  0  -0.06  0.48  0.07 
Var.  1.9e-04  5.7e-03  1.9e-03  1.9e-04  5.8e-03  2.0e-03 
MSE.  1.9e-04  5.8e-03  2.0e-03  1.9e-04  5.9e-03  2.1e-03 
Percent(%)  4.4  6.1  4.7  3.7  6.5  6.3 
α=25  True Value  -0.06  0.49  0  -0.06  0.49  0.06 
Mean  -0.06  0.45  0.02  -0.06  0.46  0.08 
Var.  9.9e-04  8.1e-03  1.9e-03  1.0e-03  7.8e-03  1.9e-03 
MSE.  1.0e-03  9.3e-03  2.5e-03  1.0e-03  9.0e-03  2.5-03 
Percent(%)  4.0  7.1  9.1  3.4  6.5  8.6 
α=45  True Value  -0.06  0.49  0  -0.06  0.49  0.06 
Mean  -0.05  0.41  0.04  -0.05  0.42  0.09 
Var.  2.5e-04  9.8e-03  1.3e-03  2.6e-04  0.010  1.3e-03 
MSE.  3.3e-04  0.016  2.6e-03  3.3e-04  0.016  2.5e-03 
Percent(%)  6.9  8.7  16.8  6.2  8.9  14.9 
α=70  True Value  -0.06  0.49  0  -0.06  0.49  0.06 
Mean  -0.05  0.33  0.04  -0.05  0.34  0.10 
Var.  4.4e-04  0.024  8.2-04  5.4e-04  0.029  1.0e-03 
MSE.  6.3e-04  0.049  2.4e-03  6.9e-04  0.051  2.3e-03 
Percent(%)  5.5  12.1  23.7  4.7  12.4  18.0 
α=100  True Value  -0.06  0.49  0  -0.06  0.49  0.06 
Mean  -0.04  0.31  0.03  -0.04  0.32  0.09 
Var.  2.8e-04  0.17  5.2e-04  3.3e-04  0.021  6.2e-04 
MSE.  7.4e-04  0.048  1.6e-03  7.6e-04  0.050  1.5e-03 
Percent(%)  19.4  25.3  28.8  15.7  21.0  19.5 
α=200  True Value  -0.06  0.49  0  -0.06  0.49  0.06 
Mean  -0.02  0.15  0.03  -0.03  0.21  0.09 
Var.  1.9e-04  0.012  1.0e-04  4.3e-04  0.026  2.2-04 
MSE.  2.0e-03  0.125  1.3e-03  1.6e-03  0.103  9.3e-04 
Percent(%)  41.7  47.2  56.3  25.3  30.0  33.9 
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For ?1  , when α is 10, there is no problem.  When α goes to 25, although the mean 
is still the same as its true value, MSE starts to differ from the variance, implying that we 
might see a bias in the mean if we have a bigger α. When α is 45, the mean is greater than 
the true value by 0.01, a 17% upward bias. The percent of iterations we can reject its true 
value is a little larger than 5%, but still less than 10%. MSE now exceeds the variance by 
about 40%. As α keep increasing, the bias becomes bigger, and MSE is almost ten times 
of the variance in Case I with α equal 200. Nearly half of the time we can reject the true 
value of ?1  .      
Table 6-4. Correlations of Facilities with Travel Cost and Quality 
  α=10  α=25  α=45  α=70  α=100  α=200 
TC-F  -0.10  -0.03  -0.20  -0.83  -0.60  -0.61 
Q-F  0.22  0.53  0.60  0.89  0.79  0.76 
 
Therefore, under the landscape of only one city, even if the coefficient in the 
facility supply equation is very big and leads to a large correlation between facilities and 
travel cost, the results may not be very remarkable. When facilities become the most 
important preference variables in place of travel cost, their economic endogeneity causes 
problems, not only to the estimates of facilities and quality, but also to the estimate of 








As stated in the introduction, whether the welfare estimates are biased or not has 
very important policy implications. Simulations make it possible to compute the true 
welfare measures. Kling (1988) compared the estimated welfare measures with the true 
welfare measures calculated from simulated data to examine the reliability of welfare 
estimates from recreation demand models. In our simulations, beyond the estimates for 
the parameters, we also calculate the true and estimated welfare measures under the basic 
landscape with random location and the landscape with only one city where the scale of 
travel cost is reduced. In the basic landscape, as the economic endogeneity of facilities 
gets stronger, there is a downward bias in ?2   and an upward bias in ?3  ; ?1   is unbiased. 
Simulations under other circumstances except the extreme case give similar results. In the 
extreme situation, when ?2   and ?3   are affected, there is also some upward bias in ?1  .  We 
want to see how the bias in estimated coefficients will affect the welfare estimates in the 
two cases. 
Following the formulas stated in Section 2, two types of values are considered: 
site value and marginal value for environmental quality change. For each random sample, 
the individual estimates are averaged across individuals to obtain the welfare estimates 
for each site. Then we average these estimates across 1,000 iterations and use those 
averages to compare with the true values. In addition, we compute the parameter ratio of 
?2 ?1   , both true values and estimates.  
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Table 7-1. Site Value in Basic Simulations with Endogenous Facilities 
#Site  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10 
α=10  Case 
I 
WTP  2.43  1.86  2.97  1.20  1.10  2.18  1.31  2.65  1.81  2.74 
???     2.43  1.84  2.98  1.20  1.11  2.18  1.31  2.64  1.81  2.75 
Case 
II 
WTP  2.45  1.84  3.03  1.18  1.07  2.18  1.28  2.68  1.80  2.79 
???     2.45  1.83  3.03  1.17  1.08  2.18  1.29  2.67  1.79  2.79 
α=25  Case 
I 
WTP  1.53  1.42  1.52  2.97  2.71  2.87  2.39  1.53  1.32  1.93 
???     1.52  1.42  1.51  2.97  2.72  2.87  2.39  1.52  1.32  1.95 
Case 
II 
WTP  1.47  1.35  1.46  3.12  2.80  3.01  2.42  1.47  1.26  1.91 
???     1.46  1.36  1.45  3.11  2.81  2.99  2.42  1.46  1.26  1.93 
α=45  Case 
I 
WTP  2.21  3.19  1.61  1.54  1.23  1.78  2.64  1.74  2.50  1.77 
???     2.21  3.23  1.62  1.52  1.22  1.77  2.69  1.74  2.45  1.77 
Case 
II 
WTP  2.25  3.55  1.53  1.44  1.11  1.72  2.80  1.68  2.60  1.71 
???     2.24  3.57  1.53  1.42  1.11  1.72  2.83  1.68  2.54  1.70 
α=70  Case 
I 
WTP  1.60  2.25  2.26  1.87  1.67  1.37  2.78  2.55  1.95  1.84 
???     1.62  2.30  2.22  1.85  1.67  1.57  2.83  2.53  1.97  1.81 
Case 
II 
WTP  1.48  2.33  2.33  1.82  1.57  1.22  3.10  2.75  1.92  1.78 
???     1.51  2.37  2.29  1.79  1.57  1.22  3.14  2.72  1.93  1.75 
α=100  Case 
I 
WTP  1.79  1.53  1.93  1.26  2.08  2.43  2.96  2.71  1.67  1.84 
???     1.77  1.56  1.96  1.27  2.02  2.43  3.02  2.69  1.63  1.85 
Case 
II 
WTP  1.67  1.32  1.86  1.02  2.06  2.61  3.62  3.10  1.50  1.73 
???     1.65  1.34  1.88  1.03  2.00  2.61  3.65  3.06  1.47  1.73 
α=200  Case 
I 
WTP  1.39  2.68  1.97  1.80  2.50  1.42  3.04  1.47  1.50  2.44 
???     1.44  2.76  1.87  1.70  2.49  1.42  3.11  1.44  1.55  2.43 
Case 
II 
WTP  0.95  3.44  1.82  1.54  2.89  1.00  4.40  1.06  1.09  2.83 
???     0.99  3.48  1.73  1.45  2.86  0.99  4.43  1.04  1.13  2.80 
 
Based on the results in Table 7-1, estimated site values are not very different from 
the true values. Only one or two deviate from the truth by more than 10%. Most are 
greater or smaller than their true values by around 2%, even in the case with quite 
remarkable bias in ?2   and ?3  . This is not surprising though. There is a downward bias in 
?2  , but an upward bias in ?3  . Maximum likelihood seeks parameters that are most likely 
to generate the observations, so although the estimates are different, the predicted  41 
 
Table 7-2. Site Value in the Landscape with One City 





WTP  2.01  1.15  1.58  1.91  1.55  1.19  2.77  1.69  1.33  2.44 
???     2.15  1.26  1.69  2.01  1.66  1.29  2.95  1.83  1.43  2.60 
Case 
II 
WTP  2.02  1.12  1.56  1.91  1.53  1.17  2.85  1.68  1.31  2.49 





WTP  1.69  1.43  1.43  1.40  1.42  2.27  1.76  2.96  1.24  2.04 
???     3.23  2.58  2.77  2.60  2.62  4.05  3.29  5.57  2.24  3.87 
Case 
II 
WTP  1.67  1.37  1.38  1.34  1.37  2.34  1.74  3.25  1.17  2.08 





WTP  2.16  1.34  1.68  1.68  1.69  1.94  2.52  2.40  1.17  1.05 
???     3.01  1.90  2.39  2.38  2.33  2.68  3.55  3.36  1.69  1.51 
Case 
II 
WTP  2.26  1.24  1.63  1.63  1.64  1.95  2.77  2.61  1.05  0.93 





WTP  1.03  2.89  1.66  1.70  1.14  3.08  0.88  2.09  1.61  1.62 
???     1.46  3.99  2.24  2.22  1.62  4.30  1.29  2.79  2.12  2.15 
Case 
II 
WTP  0.81  3.52  1.51  1.57  0.92  3.92  0.67  2.11  1.45  1.46 






WTP  0.86  2.02  2.04  1.36  1.49  1.05  2.14  1.43  3.36  1.93 
???     1.86  4.01  4.16  2.86  3.15  2.25  4.40  2.84  7.13  3.84 
Case 
II 
WTP  0.57  1.99  2.03  1.08  1.23  0.75  2.18  1.16  5.28  1.83 






WTP  2.58  1.19  1.29  1.72  2.45  2.57  1.82  1.08  1.67  1.27 




WTP  3.85  0.69  0.80  1.42  3.33  3.78  1.61  0.59  1.33  0.78 
???     -22  -3.5  -5.1  -12  -8.4  -22  -6.8  -3.1  -3.5  -2.8
2 
 
                                                            
1 In Case I when α=200, ?1   is severely biased. In total, 86 in 1,000 iterations produce positive ?1  , the 
maximum of which is 0.04. Particularly, there are 30 ?1  s distributed within (-0.001, 0.001), among which 
18 is negative and 12 is positive. The estimated WTPs correspondingly are extremely large. The negative 
?1  s dominate the positive ones, so the average WTPs are positive. Take the estimated WTP for site 1 as an 
example, among the 1,000 WTPs, the minimum is -3141, the maximum is 17,440. The median is 7.93.  
2 In Case II, 99 in 1,000 iterations give positive ?1  , the maximum of which is 0.05. There are 17 ?1  s 
distributed within (-0.001, 0.001), among which 12 is positive. They generate very large and negative 
WTPs, As they dominate the negative ?1  s, the average WTPs are negative in this situation. For the 
estimated WTP of site 1, the maximum is 670.9 and the minimum is -23,650! The median is 7.54 by the 
way, so although it is rare to have more positive ?1  s within (-0.001, 0.001) in consideration of its true value, 
the overall distribution of ?1   does not go wrong. It is those extreme values that flip the sign of the averages.  
We re-run simulations under this situation for another two times. Both have positive estimated WTPs in 
Case II. In one simulation some of the estimated WTPs in Case I and Case II are still as large as 20; in the 
other simulation, those estimates go back to the true values’ magnitude and are around 6 or 7, close to the 
medians. Anyway, those negative estimated WTPs are unusual, but that might happen. 42 
 
probability of visiting each site is similar. Plus, there is no bias in ?1  , which appears in 
the denominator of the site valuation equation. Therefore the estimated site values are 
pretty close to the truth. 
Table 7-3. Marginal Value of Quality Change in Basic Simulations 





T*  -8.2  0.96  0.77  1.13  0.51  0.48  0.89  0.56  1.03  0.76  1.07 
E*  -8.1  0.96  0.76  1.13  0.50  0.48  0.88  0.56  1.03  0.75  1.07 
Case 
II 
T  -8.2  0.97  0.76  1.15  0.50  0.47  0.89  0.55  1.04  0.75  1.09 





T  -8.2  0.64  0.60  0.64  1.14  1.06  1.12  0.95  0.65  0.58  0.79 
E  -7.8  0.61  0.58  0.61  1.10  1.02  1.07  0.91  0.62  0.55  0.76 
Case 
II 
T  -8.2  0.62  0.58  0.62  1.19  1.09  1.16  0.96  0.63  0.55  0.78 





T  -8.2  0.90  1.21  0.67  0.64  0.53  0.74  1.03  0.72  0.98  0.73 
E  -7.1  0.78  1.06  0.58  0.55  0.46  0.64  0.90  0.62  0.84  0.64 
Case 
II 
T  -8.2  0.91  1.32  0.64  0.60  0.49  0.72  1.08  0.70  1.01  0.71 





T  -8.2  0.67  0.90  0.90  0.77  0.70  0.59  1.07  1.00  0.79  0.77 
E  -6.3  0.52  0.70  0.68  0.59  0.53  0.45  0.84  0.77  0.61  0.58 
Case 
II 
T  -8.2  0.63  0.92  0.92  0.75  0.66  0.53  1.17  1.06  0.78  0.74 






T  -8.2  0.75  0.63  0.79  0.54  0.84  0.96  1.15  1.06  0.70  0.76 
E  -4.8  0.43  0.38  0.47  0.32  0.48  0.57  0.69  0.62  0.40  0.45 
Case 
II 
T  -8.2  0.70  0.55  0.76  0.44  0.82  1.01  1.34  1.18  0.63  0.71 






T  -8.2  0.59  1.05  0.81  0.74  0.98  0.60  1.16  0.62  0.64  0.97 
E  -3.8  0.28  0.50  0.36  0.32  0.45  0.28  0.55  0.28  0.30  0.45 
Case 
II 
T  -8.2  0.42  1.28  0.74  0.63  1.10  0.43  1.54  0.46  0.48  1.09 
E  -4.3  0.22  0.68  0.37  0.32  0.58  0.22  0.83  0.23  0.25  0.57 
*T: True value; E: Estimated value;   **R: Ratio of ?2 ?1   ;   ***1: Site number 
On the contrary, in landscape with only one city where the scale of travel cost is 
relatively small, as α goes up, there is a huge bias in the estimates, which could even be 43 
 
as large as the estimates themselves. We also see problems in ?1, so the estimated site 
values are no longer reliable. 
Table 7-4. Marginal Value of Quality Change in the Landscape with One City 





T  -8.2  0.93  0.55  0.74  0.88  0.72  0.56  1.25  0.79  0.63  1.11 
E  -8.5  0.97  0.57  0.77  0.90  0.75  0.59  1.30  0.83  0.65  1.15 
Case 
II 
T  -8.2  0.93  0.53  0.73  0.88  0.72  0.55  1.29  0.78  0.62  1.13 





T  -8.2  0.79  0.67  0.67  0.66  0.66  1.04  0.82  1.33  0.58  0.94 
E  -14  1.35  1.09  1.16  1.10  1.10  1.68  1.38  2.26  0.95  1.62 
Case 
II 
T  -8.2  0.78  0.64  0.65  0.64  0.64  1.06  0.81  1.45  0.55  0.95 





T  -8.2  0.99  0.63  0.78  0.78  0.79  0.90  1.14  1.10  0.56  0.50 
E  -8.8  1.07  0.68  0.85  0.85  0.83  0.96  1.25  1.18  0.61  0.54 
Case 
II 
T  -8.2  1.03  0.59  0.76  0.76  0.76  0.90  1.24  1.18  0.50  0.44 





T  -8.2  0.48  1.30  0.77  0.80  0.54  1.38  0.42  0.96  0.75  0.76 
E  -8.1  0.49  1.30  0.75  0.77  0.55  1.41  0.44  0.92  0.74  0.72 
Case 
II 
T  -8.2  0.38  1.55  0.71  0.74  0.44  1.71  0.32  0.97  0.68  0.68 






T  -8.2  0.41  0.93  0.95  0.64  0.70  0.50  0.98  0.67  1.50  0.89 
E  -9.3  0.49  1.04  1.07  0.74  0.81  0.58  1.10  0.75  1.76  0.98 
Case 
II 
T  -8.2  0.28  0.91  0.93  0.51  0.59  0.36  0.99  0.55  2.20  0.85 






T  -8.2  1.17  0.56  0.61  0.80  1.12  1.16  0.85  0.52  0.78  0.60 
E  -33  4.68  2.42  2.27  3.27  4.83  4.67  3.45  2.20  3.03  2.26 
Case 
II 
T  -8.2  1.66  0.33  0.38  0.67  1.46  1.64  0.75  0.28  0.62  0.37 
E  -13  2.66  0.54  0.66  1.31  2.02  2.73  1.11  0.45  0.79  0.49 
 
Table 7-3 and Table 7-4 present the marginal values for quality changes. Both 
results show that when the bias in the ratio of parameters grows, the difference between 
estimated values and true values are also getting bigger. In the basic landscape, if α is 
larger, the ratios of estimated quality parameters are smaller in absolute value, which is 44 
 
consistent with the simulation results. The estimated marginal value of quality change is 
also diminishing. Thus, although the economic endogeneity of facilities does not have 
much influence on the site value, it does affect the value of environmental quality. 
In landscape with only one city where the scale of travel cost is reduced, the trend 
of the bias is not as obvious as that in the basic landscape. But if we compare the results 
with α equal 10 and 200, we can see a huge difference. Although both ?1   and ?2   have a 
downward bias, the ratio of their estimates still deviates from the truth. When all 
estimated coefficients in the utility equation are biased, the welfare estimates for quality 














Researchers who conduct travel cost studies of recreation demand are often 
confronted with site characteristics that are not exogenously determined. In these 
situations researchers might rightly be concerned about the potential implications of 
endogenous site characteristics. In this paper, we use Monte Carlo simulations to 
investigate whether the economic endogeneity of facilities causes bias to the coefficient 
estimates and welfare estimates. The answer to the research question is: the economic 
endogeneity of site facilities leads to statistical endogeneity, which means the facility 
variable is correlated with individual errors, but the statistical endogeneity is not strong 
enough in most cases to cause a big problem in the estimation since facilities are 
endogenous at the aggregate level. However, this economic endogeneity still needs 
attention, because it also can induce multicollinearity of facilities with other site 
characteristics, which may cause bias to the estimates. Based on the answer, a few 
conclusions can be drawn from our simulations: 
(1) In the situation when there is a lot of variation in travel cost, which is identical to 
the basic landscape we used in the simulations, the strength of facilities’ 
economic endogeneity matters, because strong economic endogeneity results in 
high multicollinearity. If the endogeneity is very strong, we would expect a bias 
in the estimated coefficients of facilities and other site characteristic variables; 
otherwise, there is no need to worry about it. We can calculate the correlation 
between facilities and other site characteristic variables for diagnosis. The 46 
 
correlation should be very outstanding to cause a big problem. The threshold of 
the correlation to lead to bias is affected by the underlying factors of the study, 
like the number of sites, the sample characteristics, etc. Sometimes it has to be as 
high as 0.7.  
(2) No matter how strong the economic endogeneity is, there is almost always no bias 
in the estimated coefficient for travel cost, and we don’t see a huge bias in the 
welfare measure of site value. As for the value of marginal quality change on sites, 
the bias is growing as the endogeneity gets stronger. Thus the site value is less 
sensitive and more reliable than the value of marginal quality change. 
(3) When there is economic endogeneity of facilities, dropping the facility variable 
does not provide a clear solution: it will make matters worse when people do care 
about site facilities, but including the facilities can lead to spurious parameter 
significance when facilities are included yet people do not care about them. 
(4) In the situation where people cluster, especially where all people live in one area, 
which means all recreationists have similar travel costs, we don’t quite get bias in 
all estimates even if the endogeneity is very strong, except in extreme cases. We 
have to go to some length to construct simulations and landscapes which induce 
bias in the travel cost parameters. As the number of clusters increases, the results 
become closer to the situation described in the first conclusion. 
The results above apply for not only facilities, but also other site characteristics 
that are provided by site managers or a third party.  Examples of site quality 
characteristics that depend on some endogenous level of investment in monitoring or 
measurement and have been studied in recreational demand settings include water quality 47 
 
advisories for a beach, fish consumption advisories, etc. For such variables, we would 
expect managers to allocate their measurement and monitoring budget so that more 
popular sites are more likely to be measured/monitored.   
Further, in this study, we assume quality to be the same for all people; in other 
words, we use objective quality measures. The estimated coefficient of quality is also 
influenced by the multicollinearity that can be induced through the economic endogeneity 
of the supply of facilities. Some studies valuing recreation demand adopt subjective 
quality measures rather than objective ones, especially in the single site model. If 
perceived quality data is used instead of objective data, quality variable will vary across 
both people and sites, as does travel cost. Thus, its correlation with facilities will greatly 
decrease, and we would not expect to see bias in the estimated coefficients. 
In a word, in empirical studies, we need to be careful with the data and with site 
characteristics suspected to be economically endogenous, e.g., facilities. Even though 
they are site-specific, their economic endogeneity may still have substantial influence on 
the estimation results. As possible diagnostics for economic endogeneity problems, one 
can examine the distribution of recreation sites and recreationists, and compute the 
correlations of that particular site characteristic with other site characteristic variables.  
Then, based on the expected impact of the endogeneity and depending on the estimates 
the study is interested in, one can decide whether to take the possible economic 
endogeneity into account. 
 
   48 
 
REFERENCES 
Allen, P. G., T. H. Stevens, et al. (1981). “The effects of variable omission in the travel 
cost technique.” Land Economics 57(2): 173-180. 
 
Ben-Akiva, M., and S. Lerman. 1985.  Discrete choice analysis: Theory and application 
to travel demand, MIT Press: Cambridge, MA. 
 
Brown, W. G. and F. Nawas (1973). “Impact of aggregation on the estimation of outdoor 
recreation demand functions.” American Journal of Agricultural Economics 55(2): 
246-249. 
 
Cameron A.C., P.K. Trivedi, Chapter 7 “Hypothesis tests.”, Microeconometrics: Methods 
and Applications, Cambridge University Press 2005: 250-254 
 
Caulkins, P. P., R. C. Bishop, et al. (1985). “Omitted cross-price variable biases in the 
linear travel cost model: correcting common misperceptions.” Land Economics 
61(2): 182-187. 
 
Cesario, F. J. and J. L. Knetsch (1970). “Time bias in recreation benefit estimates.” Water 
Resources Research 6(3): 700-&. 
 
Cook, A. (2008). “Recreation value of a new long-distance walking track.” Tourism 
Economics 14(2): 377-391. 
 
Cutter, W. B., L. Pendleton, et al. (2007). “Activities in models of recreational demand.” 
Land Economics 83(3): 370-381. 
 
Dhar, T., J. P. Chavas, et al. (2003). "An empirical assessment of endogeneity issues in      
demand analysis for differentiated products." American Journal of Agricultural 
Economics 85(3): 605-617. 49 
 
Faghri, A., A. Lang, et al. (2002). “Integrated knowledge-based geographic information 
system for determining optimal location of park-and-ride facilities.” Journal of 
Urban Planning and Development-Asce 128(1): 18-41. 
 
Gum, R. L. and W. E. Martin (1975). “Problems and solutions in estimating the demand 
for and value of rural outdoor recreation.” American Journal of Agricultural 
Economics 57(4): 558-566. 
 
Haab, T. C. and R. L. Hicks (1997). “Accounting for choice set endogeneity in random 
utility models of recreation demand.” Journal of Environmental Economics and 
Management 34(2): 127-147. 
 
Kling, C. L. (1988). "Comparing welfare estimates of environmental quality changes 
from recreation demand models." Journal of Environmental Economics and 
Management 15(3): 331-340. 
 
Lew, D. K. and D. M. Larson (2005). “Accounting for stochastic shadow values of time 
in discrete-choice recreation demand models.” Journal of Environmental 
Economics and Management 50(2): 341-361.  
 
Lupi, F. and P. M. Feather (1998). "Using partial site aggregation to reduce bias in 
random utility travel cost models." Water Resources Research 34(12): 3595-3603. 
 
Martha E. Lee, B. L. Driver, Chapter 10 “Benefits-based management: a new paradigm 
for managing amenity resources.”, Ecosystem Management: Adaptive Strategies 
for Natural Resources Organizations in the Twenty-first Century, Taylor & 
Francis, 1999: 143-154. 
 
McConnell, K. E. and V. A. Duff (1976). “Estimating net benefits of recreation under 
conditions of excess demand.” Journal of Environmental Economics and 





Murdock, J. (2006). “Handling unobserved site characteristics in random utility models 
of recreation demand.” Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 
51(1): 1-25. 
 
Shin, W. S., R. Jaakson, et al. (2001). “Benefits-based analysis of visitor use of Sorak-
San National Park in Korea.” Environmental Management 28(3): 413-419. 
 
Timothy C. Haab, Kenneth E. McConnell, Chapter 8 “Site choice models.”, Valuing 
Environmental and Natural Resources: The Econometrics of Non-market 
Valuation, Edward Elgar Publishing 2002: 209-212. 
 
Timmins, C. and J. Murdock (2007). “A revealed preference approach to the 
measurement of congestion in travel cost models.” Journal of Environmental 
Economics and Management 53(2): 230-249. 
 
Train Kenneth, Chapter 9 “Drawing from densities.”, Discrete Choice Methods with 
Simulation, Cambridge University Press 2003: 209-210. 
 
Villas-Boas, J. M. and R. S. Winer (1999). "Endogeneity in Brand Choice Models." 
Management Science 45(10): 1324-1338. 
 
von Haefen, R. H. and D. J. Phaneuf (2008). “Identifying demand parameters in the 
presence of unobservables: a combined revealed and stated preference approach.” 
Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 56(1): 19-32. 
 
von Haefen, R. H., D. M. Massey, et al. (2005). “Serial nonparticipation in repeated 
discrete choice models.” American Journal of Agricultural Economics 87(4): 
1061-1076. 
 
Wetzel, J. N. (1977). “Estimating the benefits of recreation under conditions of 




Yang, S., Y. Chen, et al. (2003). “Bayesian analysis of simultaneous demand and supply.” 
Quantitative Marketing and Economics 1(3): 251-275. 
 
Yeh, C.-Y., T. C. Haab, et al. (2006). “Modeling multiple-objective recreation trips with 
choices over trip duration and alternative sites.” Environmental and Resource 
Economics 34: 189-209. 